风险投资对赌协议对盈余管理的影响研究——基于新三板挂牌的经验证据

风险投资对赌协议对盈余管理的影响研究——基于新三板挂牌的经验证据

Impact of Valuation Adjustment Mechanism on Earnings Management: Empirical Evidence Based on Listing Data of the New Third Board

《财经研究》2023年49卷第10期 页码：109 - 123 online：2023年10月3日

作者

中：何顶1 , 葛琰2

英：He Ding1, Ge Yan2

作者单位：1. 中国政法大学 商学院, 北京 100088; 2. 上海信公科技集团股份有限公司, 上海 201100

摘要及关键词

摘要：对赌协议在风险投资交易中广泛应用，其利弊一直饱受争议。文章基于2013年至2020年的新三板挂牌数据，考察了风险投资对赌协议对创业企业挂牌时盈余管理的影响。研究发现，风险投资对赌协议会显著增加创业企业在挂牌前一年和挂牌当年的应计盈余管理水平。这一作用主要通过弱化风险投资的监督与服务，以及向创业企业家施加挂牌压力来实现。进一步研究发现，以股权回购作为补偿方式的对赌协议对盈余管理行为影响最大，当风险投资声誉较低、挂牌企业处于非政策支持行业时，对赌协议对盈余管理的正向影响更为显著。此外，挂牌后有对赌协议的公司出现了业绩下滑。文章的研究有助于理解风险投资对赌协议的性质和经济后果，揭示了风险投资影响企业信息披露行为的契约机制，为企业盈余管理的影响因素研究提供了新证据。

关键词：风险投资；对赌协议；盈余管理

Summary: The Valuation Adjustment Mechanism (VAM) is extensively employed in venture capital, and its merits and demerits have been subject to considerable controversy. However, due to a paucity of available data and evidence, researchers have been unable to comprehensively examine and comprehend the nature of VAM. Furthermore, there has been a dearth of discussions on how VAM may affect the quality of accounting information for startups. This paper explores the impact of VAM on earnings management during the listing of startups, utilizing listing data from the New Third Board from 2013 to 2020. The evidence indicates that VAM can significantly increase the degree of accrual-based earnings management of startups in the year before and during the year of listing. The impact is mainly achieved by exerting listing pressure on entrepreneurs and weakening the supervision and service of venture capital. VAM with equity repurchase compensation has the most substantial impact on earnings management. Moreover, the positive impact of VAM on earnings management is more significant when the reputation of venture capital is low and when startups are not in industries supported by government policies. The performance of startups with VAM declines after listing. This paper delivers several contributions: First, it quantitatively evaluates the economic consequences of VAM, providing direct empirical evidence for the negative effect of VAM. Second, it reveals the contractual mechanism by which venture capital affects startups’ information disclosure behavior. Prior research on the impact of venture capital on accounting information quality has yielded inconsistent conclusions, while this paper finds that VAM is a crucial factor that contributes to the impact of venture capital on accounting information quality. Third, it provides a reference basis for deepening the reform of the New Third Board and fully implementing the registration system in China. Based on the above findings, the following policy recommendations are proposed: First, regulatory agencies should pay close attention to the accounting information quality of pre-IPO companies that have signed VAM. Second, the exit channels of venture capital should be broadened, and venture capital should be guided to carry out post-investment management and value-added services. Third, regulatory reforms should be deepened under the comprehensive registration system, the registration standards and procedures should be clearly defined, and multiple measures should be taken to ensure the quality of accounting information disclosure.

Key words:venture capital; Valuation Adjustment Mechanism; earnings management

其他信息

DOI：10.16538/j.cnki.jfe.20230714.401

收稿日期：2023-03-24

基金项目：中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助中国政法大学科研创新项目（10822517）；国家自然科学基金项目（72202231）

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