高管股权激励的环境治理效应：“名副其实”抑或“虚有其表”*——基于我国A股高污染企业的经验证据

高管股权激励的环境治理效应：“名副其实”抑或“虚有其表”*——基于我国A股高污染企业的经验证据

Environmental Governance Effect of Executive Equity Incentive: Be Worthy of the Name or a Mere Facade? Empirical Evidence Based on A-share High-pollution Enterprises

《财经研究》2023年49卷第11期 页码：50 - 64 online：2023年11月3日

作者

中：王京1 , 范明珠1 , 林慧2

英：Wang Jing1, Fan Mingzhu1, Lin Hui2

作者单位：1. 中国海洋大学 管理学院，山东 青岛 266100; 2. 厦门大学 管理学院，福建 厦门 361005

摘要及关键词

摘要：股权激励会影响高管的环保态度，而高管环保态度与动机差异会导致企业不同的环境治理投入选择。文章基于2009—2020年我国沪深两市A股高污染企业的财务数据，考察了高管股权激励与企业环境治理投入的关系，探讨了高管股权激励影响环境治理投入的作用机制，并进一步分析了外部治理环境的异质性影响。研究结果表明：高管股权激励会抑制企业转移性环境治理投入，增加其实质性环境治理投入，提高企业环保积极性，该结论在考虑了内生性问题的影响后依然稳健；进一步研究发现，提升运营效率和抑制管理层短视是高管股权激励抑制转移性环境治理投入、增加实质性环境治理投入的重要机制；环境规制、市场竞争、媒体压力和分析师关注等具有调节效应，均能够强化高管股权激励与转移性环境治理投入的负向关系，促进高管股权激励与实质性环境治理投入的正向关系。文章的研究为我国企业治理和运营机制优化以及决策部门环境治理政策的完善提供了决策参考和经验证据。

关键词：高管股权激励；异质性环境治理投入；运营效率；管理层短视；外部治理环境

Summary: Equity incentive affects the environmental attitude of senior executives, and the variation in the environmental attitude and interest orientation of senior executives will lead to different environmental governance input choices of enterprises. Therefore, based on the financial data of A-share high-pollution enterprises in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2009 to 2020, this paper examines the relationship between executive equity incentive and enterprise environmental governance input, and further analyzes the heterogeneous impact of external governance environment. The results show that executive equity incentive will inhibit transferred enterprise environmental governance input, increase its substantial input in environmental governance, and improve the enthusiasm of enterprises for environmental protection. Further research illustrates that improving operating efficiency and restraining management myopia is an important mechanism for executive equity incentive to restrain transferred environmental governance input and increase substantial environmental governance input. Moreover, environmental regulation, market competition, media pressure, and analyst attention have a moderatoring effect, which can strengthen the negative relationship between executive equity incentive and transferred environmental governance input, and promote the positive relationship between executive equity incentive and substantial environmental governance input. The contributions of this paper are as follows: First, based on manual collection and organization of different types of environmental governance input, it analyzes the impact of executive equity incentives on the transferred and substantive environmental governance input of enterprises from the perspective of input motivation heterogeneity, providing a more innovative and detailed perspective for the research on corporate environmental governance. Second, it explores how executive equity incentive exerts an impact on the heterogeneous environmental governance input of enterprises, and characterizes the mechanism from the perspectives of efficiency and governance. Third, it directly discusses the impact of executive equity incentive on environmental governance input, which not only enriches the literature in the field of corporate environmental governance, but also provides empirical evidence for the optimization of corporate internal and external governance mechanisms and environmental input decisions, and provides a reference for the improvement and deepening of environmental governance policies of decision-making departments in China.

Key words:executive equity incentive; heterogeneous environmental governance input; operating efficiency; management myopia; external governance environment

其他信息

DOI：10.16538/j.cnki.jfe.20230617.302

收稿日期：2022-11-18

基金项目：国家自然科学基金面上项目（72172144）；山东省自然科学基金项目（ZR2022QG028）

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